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Common Defects of the Divorce Bill and Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) 
Bill 2016-17 
 
Sharon Thompson and Russell Sandberg 
School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University 
 
The Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill 2016-17 and Arbitration and Mediation Services 
(Equality) Bill 2016-17 share several commonalities. Both are Private Members Bills 
currently before Parliament that have been introduced repeatedly in the House of Lords. Both 
had a second reading debate on the same day (27th January 2017). Both were received 
favourably by the Lords and passed to Committee stage. And most importantly, when both 
Bills were debated, research findings as to the consequences the proposed legislation would 
have on Family Law in England and Wales was largely unacknowledged. In this article, we 
discuss what was not considered but should have been in each of the Lords’ Second Reading 
debates and the implications of these omissions. 
 
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill 
Baroness Deech’s Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill has three main components: equal 
division of net matrimonial assets (that is, deferred community of property), the curbing of 
periodical payments to a maximum of five years (unless this would lead to ‘serious financial 
hardship’) and binding prenuptial agreements (subject to standard procedural safeguards such 
as independent advice, cool-off periods and disclosure). Each component seeks to reform the 
law of financial provision on divorce pursuant to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in order 
to clean up its ‘antagonistic and inflammatory’ nature and make it more certain (Hansard, HL 
Deb vol 778, col 945, 27 January 2017). Baroness Deech’s proposals would indeed bring 
more certainty, something that judges, practitioners and academics agree is especially 
pressing since the removal of legal aid from Family Law. However, closer scrutiny of 
Deech’s arguments is vital in order to determine what would be lost by introducing the 
legislative provisions she is proposing. Though she notes that most ‘people prefer the 
certainty of misery to the misery of uncertainty’ (Hansard, HL Deb vol 778, col 948, 27 
January 2017), she does not explain what certain misery means, nor does she acknowledge 
the potentially harmful consequences of reform as detailed in academic research. 
 
One of Baroness Deech’s most persuasive assertions is that her Bill follows a legal system 
with proven success – Scotland. She argues England and Wales should seek to emulate 
success of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 by dividing matrimonial property equally and 
by making prenuptial agreements binding. The 1985 Act’s effectiveness is supported by 
Mair, Mordaunt and Wasoff’s insightful research, which indicates broad satisfaction among 
Scottish practitioners with the legislation (Mair, Mordaunt and Wasoff, Built to Last: The 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 – 30 Years of Financial Provision on Divorce (Nuffield 
2016)). The appeal of the Scottish experience is therefore unsurprising. But, although 
comparative perspectives can be invaluable, transposing the approach of another jurisdiction 
onto one’s own must not be done before understanding the context in which the system 
operates. Whilst Scotland recognises contracts that look very much like prenuptial 
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agreements, such contracts are different not least because they have evolved to opt out of a 
default system very different to that in England and Wales. Furthermore, Mair, Wasoff and 
Mackay (All Settled? A Study of Legally Binding Separation Agreements and Private 
Ordering in Scotland: Final Report (ESRC 2013)) describe factors such as long established 
recognition of marriage-related contracts as contributing to a ‘settlement-friendly’ 
environment in Scotland that is very different from the legal landscape in England and Wales.  
 
As a result, any comparison between English and Scottish law must be sensitive to 
jurisdictional differences. This is not to say Baroness Deech’s account of the benefits of equal 
division of post-marital assets is unimportant. Cooke, Barlow and Callus (Community of 
Property: A Regime for England and Wales? (Nuffield 2006)) have also acknowledged the 
attractions of the certainty achieved by this property regime. Yet, although Baroness Deech 
repeatedly emphasises fair division of assets through equal sharing (Hansard, HL Deb vol 
778, col 947, 27 January 2017), Cooke et al’s research reminds us that even if equal division 
seems equivalent to fairness in the public mind, this is not necessarily the case in practice 
(2006, p. 36). Ring-fencing non-matrimonial property and removing judicial discretion from 
property adjustment would result in a double blow to the non-moneyed spouse because it 
would remove flexibility to divide non-matrimonial property so that spousal needs are met 
and it would remove flexibility to recognise the value of non-financial contributions to the 
family in long marriages. 
 
A further blow to the non-moneyed spouse is in clause 5(c) of the Bill, which limits 
periodical payments to a maximum of five years unless serious financial hardship can be 
established. Recent research indicates that women take longer than men to recover 
economically on relationship breakdown at all levels of wealth (Fisher and Low, ‘Recovery 
from Divorce: Comparing High and Low Income Couples’ (2016) 30(3) IJLPF 338), and 
Deech’s proposed curb on maintenance will only exacerbate this inequality. This provision 
would bring an end to the non-discrimination principle championed in White v White [2010] 
UKHL 54 by prioritising financial contributions and would see a return to the pre-White era 
whereby the non-moneyed spouse would be required to produce a budget of her needs so that 
it could be assessed whether five years of periodical payments is ‘reasonable’. This is clearly 
in line with the outmoded pre-White mentality that the breadwinner’s assets are his alone. 
 
Baroness Deech’s justification for this is that the ‘divorcing wives of oligarchs’ are being 
awarded ‘£83,000 per annum [for] cocktail dresses – a sum that would provide 19.7 million 
water purification tablets for Africa’ (Hansard, HL Deb vol 778, col 946, 27 January 2017) 
whilst other ex-wives are struggling. This gendered gold-digging trope is consistently used to 
justify the protection of the moneyed spouse’s property to the detriment of the non-moneyed 
spouse. The effect of this is to disproportionately harm women (see S Thompson, ‘In Defence 
of the “Gold-Digger”’ (2016) 6(6) Oñati Socio-Legal Series 1225). Refuting this, Deech says 
women want this reform, because there is now equality in work and education. There are 
indeed more female principal breadwinners than ever before but importantly, this does not 
mean modern division of labour in the home is equal. Indeed, limiting financial provision in a 
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way that affects caregiving spouses reinforces structural inequalities between men and 
women in the family. 
 
Finally, the Deech Bill would introduce binding prenuptial and postnuptial agreements. It 
arguably makes sense that legislation seeking to introduce deferred community of property 
would also require a provision enabling couples to contract out of its one size fits all 
approach. However, clause 3 of the Bill would make nuptial agreements binding with almost 
no exception, an approach more extreme than in jurisdictions where such agreements are 
enforced (see, e.g,  S Thompson, Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free Choice 
(Hart, 2015) chapter 3). The clause incorporates procedural safeguards at the drafting stage 
but there is no facility to account for changes in circumstances after the agreement has been 
signed. Unlike the Law Commission’s recommendations (Law Com No 343, Matrimonial 
Property, Needs and Agreements (HMSO, 2014)) the Bill contains no requirement for 
spousal needs to be met. Deech’s case for binding prenups is supported by a YouGov poll 
(‘Survey Results: Prenups’ 2010) indicating public appetite for reform. But no mention is 
made of Barlow and Smithson’s research, which presents a more nuanced picture of public 
opinion than YouGov and demonstrates that understanding the effects of binding prenups can 
change the perception of those surveyed (‘Is Modern Marriage a Bargain: Exploring 
Perceptions of Pre-Nuptial Agreements in England and Wales’ (2012) 24 CFLQ 304.). 
Despite the clear need for reform and the Bill’s laudable intentions, the wider ramifications of 
these proposed reforms merits closer attention.   There is a risk that these changes may 
exacerbate gendered inequalities between spouses both during marriage and on separation by 
rejecting judicial flexibility to that properly values caring contributions in favour of 
procedural certainty. 
 
 
Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) 
Baroness Cox’s Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill was first introduced into 
the House of Lords in June 2011 and has been repeatedly reintroduced with slight 
amendments since. Although the letter of the Bill does not single out religion let alone Islam, 
it is clear from the debate, briefings and examples given in the Bill that the focus is very 
much part of the concerns about the operation of religious courts and tribunals, especially 
those applying Sharia law, which are also manifest in the current Home Office’s Independent 
Review into Sharia and a Commons Home Affairs Committee Inquiry on the topic. The 
concerns about Sharia escalated following the lecture by the then Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Dr Rowan Williams on ‘Religious and Civil Law in England’ in February 2008 (published in 
(2008) 10 EccLJ 262). In recent years there have been a number of academic studies of the 
topic. However, although we now know a great deal about the operation of the most visible 
Sharia tribunals, we still do not know how representative they are.  The number of such 
tribunals, let alone the existence and quantity of more informal means of religious based 
adjudication, remains unknown. As the then Home Secretary Theresa May noted in March 
2015, there are many anecdotal suggestions ‘of sharia law being used to discriminate against 
women’ but while ‘we know we have a problem, but we do not yet know the full extent of the 
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problem’ (<http://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-built-on-our-
values>). 
 
Providing a legislative solution without full sight of the problem is therefore tricky and while 
the aims of Baroness Cox’s Bill in prohibiting gender discrimination are entirely laudable, the 
Bill as currently drafted would have little legal effect. It seeks to amend both the Arbitration 
Act 1996 and the Equality Act 2010 to make it clear that discrimination on grounds of sex is 
unlawful in relation to arbitration and mediation.  It is questionable whether such provisions 
are necessary given that such safeguards are already present in both statutes. However, even 
ignoring this point, the Bill would have little effect upon religiously based dispute resolution. 
Existing research (e.g. G Douglas et al, ‘Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce 
and Religious Courts’ (Cardiff, 2011) <http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/research/cohesion.html>) 
has underlined that most religious tribunals studied do not operate under the Arbitration Act 
1996 and that any mediation services provided are separate from judgment of the tribunal. 
There are some religious tribunals who do operate under the 1996 Act for certain purposes 
but these are the exceptions to the rule. The evidence we have suggests that religious 
tribunals are mostly concerned with questions of religious status: their role does not fit under 
the Bill’s description of ‘providing a service in relation to arbitration’. The tribunals studied 
said that they were providing a religious rather than legal function.  Such tribunals were being 
used by adherents in order to obtain licence to remarry within their faith.  Of course, it is 
unknown whether this is as equally true to the tribunals and other informal forums not 
studied. Yet, it is difficult to see how any rulings of such bodies could be described as 
arbitration or mediation as regulated under the Arbitration Act 1996.   
 
This misconception of the role of religious tribunals and the haste to assume that their 
activities can be covered under existing legal provisions can also be seen in Clause 5 of the 
Bill which seeks to create a new criminal offence of falsely purporting to ‘exercise of any of 
the powers or duties of a court, or in the case of a purported arbitration, to make legally 
binding rulings without any basis whatsoever under the Arbitration Act 1996’.   This 
proposed offence would appear to criminalise any disciplinary or judgment-making body. 
None of the religious tribunals studied to date falsely purported (or indeed purported at all) to 
have an authority equivalent to that exercised by the courts of the State – they are voluntary 
associations which exercise no coercive power (see Shergill v Khaira [2014] UKSC 33 at 
[47]). This again assumes that most of the activities of religious tribunals can be described as 
operating under the Arbitration Act 1996. Their decisions were not intended to be legally 
binding under State law.  Although research has shown that it is possible to redraft the Bill to 
cover all  non-statutory courts and tribunals (R Sandberg and F Cranmer, ‘Appendix: Non-
Statutory Courts and Tribunals (Consent to Jurisdiction) Bill in R Sandberg (ed.) Religion 
and Legal Pluralism (Ashgate, 2015) 273), most commentators are agreed that greater 
education is needed rather than legislation, though some have contemplated a registration / 
inspection system for religious tribunals (R Sandberg et al, ‘Britain’s Religious Tribunals: 
“Joint Governance” in Practice’(2013)  33(2) OJLS 263).  
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At Second Reading (Hansard, HL Deb vol 778, col 892, 27 January 2017), many peers raised 
a number of legitimate concerns about the interaction between religious rules and the law of 
the land. Yet, the Bill as drafted will have little effect upon the operation of religious 
tribunals let alone these wider concerns. Part of the issue here is that we are still unsure what 
the problems are since we know very little about the operation of religious tribunals other 
than the most high profile and frequently studied institutions. However, as several peers 
pointed out during the Second Reading, we do know that there is a significant issue in 
relation to unregistered marriages within Islam in particular. The research to date has shown 
that a number of those who use Sharia Councils do not have a marriage legally registered 
under State law (in addition to the Cardiff study, see also S Shah-Kazemi, Untying the Knot: 
Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah (Nuffield Foundation, 2001) and S Bano, Muslim 
Women and Shari'ah Councils (Palgrave, 2012)).  We do not know the true extent of this 
issue since this research does not reveal the numbers of recognised or non-recognised 
marriages that are never dealt with by the Councils. However, this is concerning given that if 
difficulties arise in the relationship these couples have very limited remedies under English 
civil law and often did not realise that this was the case: they assumed that their religious 
marriage had legal effect under State law.   
 
The Cox Bill seeks to deal with this issue by extending the public sector equality duty under 
the Equality Act 2010 to include ‘informing individuals of the need to obtain an officially 
recognised marriage in order to have legal protection’.  Although this would be a laudable 
first step, this would only apply to public authorities. It is therefore questionable whether this 
suggestion would have any significant effect for groups and individuals who have little 
interaction with the State. Moreover, as we have argued elsewhere (R Sandberg and S 
Thompson, ‘The Sharia Law Debate: The Missing Family Law Context’ (2016) 177 Law and 
Justice 181), this issue needs to be seen within the wider context of reforms needed in Family 
Law given that the situation of unregistered religious marriages has much in common with 
the myth of common law marriage. There is a need for reform here but this should be part of 
the general need to revisit the current law on the rights and protection given to cohabiting 
couples as well as the formalities required for marriage proposed by the Law Commission’s 
Getting Married: A Scoping Paper (Law Com, 17 December 2015). 
 
Conclusion 
The Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill 2016-17 and Arbitration and Mediation Services 
(Equality) Bill 2016-17 have much in common. Both the Deech Bill and the Cox Bill are 
intended to deal with laudable concerns about the operation of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 and the operation of religious courts and tribunals respectively. However, the proposals 
they both make are problematic, especially in terms of unwitting effects that may hinder 
gender equality. Baroness Deech’s Bill assumes an easy transplant of the Scottish model and 
overlooks the way in which the move to equal division would remove the flexibility that 
currently exists, which would run the risk of reinforcing structural inequalities between men 
and women in the family. Baroness Cox’s Bill assumes that most of the activities of religious 
tribunals would be caught under the Arbitration Act 1996 and overlooks the way in which 
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religious tribunals are used in matrimonial matters and would do little to address the 
significant issues raised by unregistered marriages.  
 
These issues are unlikely to go away.  It is now improbable that either Bill will be debated at 
Committee stage before this Parliamentary session runs out of time. However, it is also 
unlikely that this is the last time the provisions discussed in this article will be debated. These 
are unresolved, emotive and controversial issues as shown by the fact that both Bills have 
been reintroduced in the Lords more than once before. However, the problem with both Bills 
as currently drafted is that the issues they seek to resolve cannot be dealt with in isolation. 
These are matters on which there is now a significant body of research and a number of 
reports and papers by the Law Commission, underscoring the need for a wider reform of the 
family law system. This is something which the Government has recognised (Hansard, HL 
Deb vol 778, col 964, 27 January 2017).   
 
Moreover, these are also areas where education is arguably more important than legislation 
and where there is a need for the judiciary to explore the cases before them in a fact sensitive 
way, paying particular attention to the power relationship between the parties. In our work we 
have suggested the need for an approach combining insights from contract theory and 
feminism – labelled Feminist Relational Contract Theory – which we have applied in relation 
to both prenups (see S Thompson, Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free 
Choice (Hart, 2015) chapters 5 and 6) and religious tribunals (R Sandberg and S Thompson, 
‘Relational Autonomy and Religious Tribunals’ (2017) OJLR (forthcoming)).  There are no 
easy answers to the issues raised by these Bills but the importance of these matters to 
people’s lives mean that the temptation of quick and attractive but ultimately flawed statutory 
solutions must be overcome.    
 
